I.

The debate concerning the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction. G.E.M.
Anscombe inaugurated the ongoing debate concerning the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen (henceforth i/f) distinction as employed by natural lawyers in double-effect reasoning (DER). Using DER, natural lawyers evaluate, e.g., terror bombing in which one intentionally targets civilians as impermissible while regarding as permissible consequentially comparable tactical bombing in which one foreseeably but without intent harms non-combatants while targeting a military installation. The i/f distinction generates much of the dispute concerning DER. With respect to the i/f distinction the disputants have paid attention -in decreasing order -to three allied topics: first, the distinction between intent and foresight; second, the application of the distinction to the disputed cases such as terror and tactical bombing; and, third and finally, the moral significance, or lack thereof, of the distinction. 1 This third topic -relatively neglected considering its importance -occupies our interest in this paper.
In what follows I propose to address the resources provided by Aristotle in his account of the voluntary -focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics -for the ethical import of the disputed distinction. 2 Before doing so, however, a question naturally arises. Namely, considering that DER originates with Thomas Aquinas, why look to Aristotle for the moral relevance of a distinction he himself neither makes nor employs? 3 Indeed, Aquinas addresses the nature of intent at some length while Aristotle -at least prima facie -does not employ the concept nor any obvious analog. Moreover, Thomas contrasts intent from foresight while Aristotle -ultima facie -does not indicate any concern for the question at issue. Is it not, at the very least, anachronistic and, more objectionably, willful to look towards Aristotle's account of the voluntary for the grounds 2 of a distinction proposed by Aquinas some sixteen centuries subsequently? If this paper succeeds, it will have answered this appropriately skeptical initial question. Allow me here to propose that the i/f distinction instances a ramification of a more basic action-theory distinction full of ethical import -namely, that made by Aristotle between the voluntary and the deliberately decided upon. Attention to Aristotle's distinction between the voluntary and the decided upon shows the ethical import of the i/f distinction. Thus, I ask the doubting reader to suspend disbelief in order to entertain the exercise with some hope that it may prove fruitful.
Before turning to Aristotle's account, I will present the more salient contours of the current debate concerning the ethical significance of the i/f distinction.
Few advocates of DER bother to articulate the moral relevance of the i/f distinction. 4 Rather, given the widely recognized intuitive appeal of the distinction, most leave off argument once they establish that, for example, the deaths of non-combatants in terror bombing are intended while those in tactical bombing are foreseen but not intended. 5 For many intuit it as worse to intend to bring about a bad outcome than foreseeably to cause a comparable effect concomitant with an intended good one seeks to effect. Accordingly, advocates of DER typically do no more than establish the first two of the above-noted three disputed points. Namely, first, they distinguish intent from foresight; and, second, they show that the impermissible act incorporates intent while the permissible act does not. Of course, as opponents note, this is inadequate for at least two reasons.
First, while those who quarrel with double effect acknowledge the widely recognized intuitive basis for somehow distinguishing the intended from the foreseen but not intended causing of a bad outcome, they do not think this is best captured by drawing an ethical contrast between the relevant acts. Rather, (as will shortly become more evident) they think it best to 3 locate the moral relevance of the i/f distinction in agent-assessment, not in act-evaluation.
Second, even if one were to concede that the i/f distinction does have ethical significance in actevaluation, why give it such great weight as to mark off the impermissible from the permissible?
Why not, rather, consider it as differentiating, for example, tactical from terror bombing as the better from the less good act, both of which remain permissible? Of course, the first question does come first. For if one misplaces the moral import of the i/f distinction in act-assessment when it properly belongs in agent-assessment, then the point concerning the permissibility of acts becomes moot. Accordingly, allow me to present the debate bearing on the first question, the proper place of the ethical import of the i/f distinction. Given limitations of space, this topic serves as my exclusive concern in this paper. This paper, however, does limn the outlines of a response to the above-noted second question.
Contemporary opponents of DER -both thinkers sympathetic to consequentialism such as Jonathan Bennett and deontologists such as Judith Jarvis Thomson and T. M. Scanlonpropose that the natural lawyer errs, not in giving the i/f distinction moral weight, but in locating its significance in act-evaluation. 6 These thinkers claim, rather, that one more appropriately places the ethical significance of the i/f distinction in agent-assessment. For example, the deontologist J. J. Thomson proposes that locating the moral import of the i/f distinction in actassessment amounts to: a failure to take seriously enough the fact -I think it is plainly a fact -that the question whether it is morally permissible for a person to do a thing is just not the same as the question whether the person who does it is thereby shown to be a bad person. done out of fear of greater evils. Accordingly, while notable, it does not serve to contrast the two acts, or for that matter, the agents.) 10 Putting mixed acts to the side, an unconditionally forced happening has an origin external to the one forced, yet not external as a motive for or goal of action (as the sweetness of the strawberries moves one to pick and eat them (1111a25-33)), but as exerting an agency which affects and controls the individual from beginning to end as kidnappers blindfold, gag, and handcuff a wealthy industrialist's daughter and in so doing preclude her agency. We cannot speak of her as the agent of the kidnaping, but as the victim. She effects nothing; rather, the agency of others affects her (1110a2). If she were to assist her abductors in eluding the security force guarding her residence, we would characterize her, not as the victim of a countervoluntary occurrence, but as an agent of her own kidnaping. The one who suffers from force does so to the extent to which she does not contribute to what comes about. Nor would we say that she were abducted countervoluntarily if she found her kidnaping enjoyable: the victims of force 7 experience the actions affecting them with occurrent pain and subsequent regret (1110b12, 1110b19, 1111a22 and 1111a32). The girl must be handcuffed, gagged, and carried out of her home because she resists being kidnaped and contributes nothing to an event which she presently finds painful and subsequently worthy of regret. In an event countervoluntary by force, an individual (most properly spoken of as a victim) suffers due to an external agency which causes an outcome she regrets while neither contributing to nor desiring it. terrorizes, maims, and kills civilians.
As noted previously, Aristotle speaks of acting in such circumstances as a "mixed" act, or a voluntary act performed in circumstances one would not choose. Similarly, the terror bomber acts in mixed circumstances. For, presumably, just as, absent constraint, no one would elect to bomb a military installation with civilians present, so, too, absent constraint, no one would choose to terror bomb. As Aristotle says, apart from circumstances, "no one would choose any such act for itself" (1110a19). Accordingly, terror and tactical bombing share the character of being voluntary acts performed in circumstances themselves not voluntary. Thus, the acts do not differ in this respect. Both instance the voluntary terrorizing, killing, and maiming of civilians. How, then, do they differ?
They differ, not as the simply voluntary differs from the deliberate, but, rather, in terms of which aspects of each act are deliberate. When one contrasts those simply voluntary aspects of each act from its deliberate elements, one sees the ethical import of the i/f distinction by which one ethically evaluates terror bombing as differing from tactical bombing. 16 Consider the deliberate elements found in terror bombing. As uniformly presented in the literature, one terror bombs in order to lower civilian morale, thereby undermine support for the war, and, thereby, achieve victory. The terrorization of civilians serves as the proximate goal of terror bombing. To terrorize civilians one deliberates about and decides upon means proportioned to that end. So, for example, if one determines that incendiary bombs best maim, kill, terrorize, and demoralize civilians, then one decides upon them as one's means. Terror bombing instantiates deliberately decided upon terrorization of harmless (innocent), noncombatants including infants, children, women, the elderly, the disabled, and the mentally incompetent.
By contrast, picture the deliberate elements in tactical bombing. One has recourse to tactical bombing in order to destroy a military installation, and, thereby, advance the cause of victory. The destruction of a military installation, say an artillery battery, serves as the proximate goal of tactical bombing, So, for example, if one determines that incendiary bombs best destroy the battery, then one decides upon them as one's means. Tactical bombing instances the deliberately decided upon destruction of a military target concomitantly harming the abovedescribed non-combatant populace.
As is customary in the debate concerning double effect and the i/f distinction waged between, on the one hand, natural lawyers and, on the other, consequentialists and deontologists, in contrasting terror and tactical bombing, one stipulates comparable consequences.
Accordingly, imagine the above acts of terror and tactical bombing as effecting comparable consequences. Both do terrorize, kill and maim civilians (to the same extent and with the same magnitude) while destroying the artillery battery. In turn, both do undermine support for the war and impede the enemy's military. Similarly, both do advance the cause of victory. Why, then, contrast the two acts in question? Why not simply claim, as opponents of double effect and the i/f distinction do claim, that while terror bombing does not differ from consequentially comparable tactical bombing, the terror bomber is a worse agent than the tactical bomber and leave it at that? Two responses come to mind. First, to do so is to employ superficial, inadequate, indeed childish (in the sense of "fit for children, not adults") criteria for act-evaluation. Second, and more importantly, to do so is entirely to ignore the salient and multifarious viciousness of terror bombing in contrast to the absence of the same in tactical bombing.
Allow me to frame the first charge of superficiality. As Aristotle's account indicates, amongst our acts we can readily contrast those that are simply voluntary (knowing-willing in the sense of aware or conscious-willing), say the act of walking, and those that in addition to being Moreover, they lack the resources by which to assess an act's exemplification of virtue or vice. I submit that the above serves as a response to those critics of the i/f distinction who do not grant it ethical import in act-evaluation.
At the outset of this paper, I noted that in addition to showing that the distinction has moral relevance in act-assessment (which I take myself to have done) one must also show that it correctly marks the division between impermissible and permissible acts (which I do not take myself to have adequately established). In pointing towards the latter task, I recall G. E. M.
Anscombe's magisterial admonition:
[i]t would be a great improvement if, instead of "morally wrong," one always names a genus such as "untruthful," "unchaste," "unjust." We should no longer ask whether doing something was "wrong," passing directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be clear at once.
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I hope in the arguments I have presented above (although falling short of being, "clear at once") to have made some contribution towards that much-to-be-hoped for, "great improvement". grow old and die, simply not wanting some outcome does not make it countervoluntary. It must also be under our control, up to us, the kind of thing that we can effect or affect. 
